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Abstract
When the same group of voters want to have a number of
different tasks performed, but can observe performance only
imperfectly, the best way to do so is to bundle the tasks together
and hold a single agent responsible for them all. Other methods are
subject to manipulation. That's why municipalities elect mayors
who are responsible for a large number of different functions, rather
than separate commissioners for each different function.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the unusual features of local governments (and national governments, too) is
that they do so many different things. Even a small suburban town will have a police
department, a road department, a sewer department, a playground, a library, parking lots, a
zoning board, a marriage license bureau, maybe a swimming pool, and a host of
regulations on matters as diverse as the treatment of animals and the width of sidewalks.
Through direct or indirect contracts it will also regulate street lighting, garbage removal,
and water purifying.
Big cities go further: in addition to the services of a small town, New York City has
a paid fire department, a school board, a health department and a string of hospitals, several
welfare programs, a court system and jails, public housing, shelters for the homeless, a
university, a parks department, subways and buses, a tourist information bureau, a film
bureau, a surrogate and a probate bureau, an animal pound, an aggressive car-towing
operation, street sweepers, and programs to combat discrimination and domestic violence.
Governments differ greatly in what the do — Ladd and Yinger [1991] catalog many of the
differences among large American cities and Fuchs [1992] emphasizes these differences in
her comparison of New York City and Chicago — but almost all of them do a variety of
different things.
The question I try to answer in this paper is what purpose this variety serves. Why
are so few officials elected to handle so many functions? It's hard to believe that the person
innately most talented to run the police department is always also the best person to clean
the sewers — and even if she were, comparative advantage would argue for splitting the
jobs. It's also hard to believe that people's tastes among styles of policing and sewer
cleaning are correlated, or that some underlying ideology links, say, the use of Ravo street
sweepers and keeping the community pool open on Wednesday nights. Electing a mayor
who then hires a police chief and a fire chief surely generates information rents within the
hierarchy; the question is why voters do not eliminate those information rents by
eliminating the hierarchy and electing a police chief and a fire chief directly.
Some might argue that voter ignorance -- either bounded rationality or limited
computational ability or just plain ignorance -- is the reason why police, fire, and library
chiefs are not elected separately. I do not think this answer is correct. Electing a mayor in
fact requires greater computational ability on the part of voters, and just as much
information. When they vote for a mayor, voters have to consider what she has done or
will do with each of the functions separately, and then somehow aggregate this information
into an overall assessment. Separate elections remove the aggregation step, and so reduce
voters' computational burdens. Voters may have to exercise their fingers more, but not
their brains.
The answer I give is also about information, but in a different way. The chief result
of this paper is that with many principals it is easier (in a sense I will make precise) to
control one agent who is charged with several tasks than to control several agents who are
each charged with one task. Specifically, I will show that with many principals and one
agent the only nonmanipulable mechanisms are "one-step," — the agent either gets paid a
fixed amount or nothing — no matter how many tasks the agent has to perform.
Mechanisms where police performance might be rewarded but not fire performance are
many-step, and so this proposition says that they are manipulable. Avoiding manipulation
is the argument for the short ballot — those mechanisms are best which force voters to
accept or reject an entire ensemble of performances and prohibit them from picking and
choosing performances they like and do not like individually.
The next section of the paper sets out the model and explains what is meant by
manipulability and why we would not want to see mechanisms that were manipulable.
This section follows reasonably closely the set up in O'Flaherty [1990]. Section 3 is about
a special case ~ when the agent has only three actions to choose among. Because this
special case is amenable to a simple graphic presentation, I can present here an intuitive
argument for the paper's fundamental proposition. That proposition itself is stated and
proved for the general case in section 4. Section 5 extends this result by showing that in
certain cases majority rule is the only one-step mechanism that is not manipulable. Section
6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
An agent chooses one action from a finite set A of possible actions; this set contains
(m+1) elements. The cost to the agent of choosing action 0 is zero; the cost of action j is
(-cj). Thus under perfect certainty, the agent would have to receive cj in order to take
action 0 rather than action j . The agent is risk-neutral.
A large number n of principals care about which action the agent takes. The
principals are identical ex ante. They cannot observe the agent's action directly. Instead
each principal i observes a random signal Xi. The distribution of this signal depends on
which action the agent took. Specifically signal Xj has s dimensions, and if the agent takes
action j has probability density function Wj(.). The expected value of X[ when the agent
takes action j is the vector |ij. For each action j , the probability density function has two
properties:
(a) its support is all of Rs.
(b) Wj(X) is a monotonically decreasing function of the Euclidean distance Ijij-XI
between X and [ij; this function is the same for all actions j .
The agent, in other words, controls the mean of a symmetric and unimodal
distribution. These conditions are met, for instance, if the signal is drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution with a scalar multiple of the identity matrix as its variance-
covariance matrix.
Conditional on the agent's action, the signals that different agents receive are
independent. Let x = (Xi,..., Xn) denote an n-tuple of agent's signals; the dimension of X
is (n x s). We will refer to x as an experience matrix. Denote the probability of experience
matrix x if the agent takes action j as WJ(X). From the independence assumption, if x =
(Xi,..., Xk, . . . ,Xn)
wj(x) = n £ = 1 Wj(Xk).
Often there is a relationship between the number of actions (m+1) available to the
agent and the number of dimensions s of the signals that principals receive. In the simplest
case, m=s=l: the agent chooses to work or shirk and the principals receive a one
dimensional signal about what she did. I discussed this case in O'Flaherty [1990].
Suppose, however, that the agent is responsible for both police and fire protection, and can
either work or shirk on each task. Then the number of actions available to the agent is four;
and if principals receive signals about each service, the number of dimensions of their
signals is two. Thus often it will be convenient to identity s; the dimensionality of the
signals, with the number of separate "tasks" the agent is charged with performing. Then if
task t can be done in rt different ways
m + 1 =rL_i r t .
This relationship between tasks and signals is needed for interpreting some of the results,
but many of the mathematical results are more general.
Assume that action 0 is sufficiently better for the principals than any other action
that, when all costs are considered, they want it to be implemented; it is the efficient action.
Assume further that the agent has no alternative use of her time; there is no individual
rationality constraint. The problem, then, is to find a mechanism that implements action 0.
Without loss of generality, we confine our attention to direct mechanisms.
Let Ej(M) denote the expected payment to the principal under mechanism M if she
takes action j . We call a mechanism feasible if
(1) E0(M)-Ej(M)>cj
for all j> 1. We call a mechanism wasteful if
E0(M)-Ej(M)>cj
forallj>l.
We would not expect to see a wasteful mechanism. The principals could agree
unanimously to change it; or equivalently, some of them could extract a bribe from the
agent for the privilege of being agent, and action 0 would still be implemented.
Not being wasteful, however, is a weak requirement for an electoral mechanism. A
stronger requirement is, roughly speaking that the mechanism not be susceptible to
mendacious behavior designed to turn it into a wasteful mechanism. O'Flaherty [1990]
showed that in the special case m = s = 1, this stronger requirement was met only by
majority rule.
Specifically, for any mechanism M let cc(p,x,M) denote the probability that the
mechanism orders payment p when the principals (jointly) report experience matrix x. Let
p(p,M) denote the set of experience matrices for which the probability of payment p is
positive:
p(p,M) = {xlcc(p,x,M).>0}.
Let P(M) denote the set of payments p for which p(p,M) is not empty; equivalently, P(M)
is the set of possible payments under M. We assume that negative payments are
impossible, and that zero payments are always possible: 0 e P(M) for all M. Given risk-
neutrality and no individual rationality constraint, this latter restriction is clearly innocuous.
A mechanism M* is a replica of M if P(M ) is a subset of P(M); that is if every payment
amount that could be ordered under M* could also be ordered under M.
We will call a feasible mechanism M manipnlable if there is some other mechanism
M* that is a replica of M and for which
Eo(M*) - Ej(M*) > Eo(M) - Ej(M)
for all j for which (1) is binding and
Eo(M*) - Ej(M*) > Eo(M) - Ej(M)
for all j for which (1) is not binding.
After a manipulable mechanism has been set up, someone can make the following
proposal to the principals: "Report your experiences to me instead of to the center. For any
p, if you experiences are in p(p,M*) I will report some experiences in p(p,M) to the center.
If we follow this procedure we will create a wasteful mechanism. Then we can extort a
kickback from the agent, who will still do action 0, or just simply reduce our payments,
and all of us will be better off." Even the agent can make this speech; so can the center.
The center, in fact, as a dishonest vote counter doesn't have to make the speech; she can
merely say she has received reports of experiences in p(p,M) whenever she receives
reports of experiences in p(p,M*), and collect a bribe from the agent for doing so.
The basic result in this paper is about the number of different payment amounts in
nonmanipulable mechanisms. Unfortunately, nonmanipulability is defined by integrals,
and since integrals over regions of measure zero are zero [Regosinski, 1966, p. 101,
theorem 68], nonmanipulability places no restrictions on any payments p that are made for
experiences in regions of measure zero. To avoid this nuisance, define P*(m) as the set of
payments that are made in regions of positive measure:
P*(m)={plp(p,M) has positive measure }.
A mechanism M, then, is called t-step if P*(m) has precisely t elements, other than zero.
The fundamental result of this paper is that all nonmanipulable mechanisms are one-step.
A final word on vector notation, for any vector y=(yk), we will say that y is strictly
positive if yk>0 for all k; y is strictly negative if yk < 0 for all k. The positive quadrant, or
positive orthant consists of all strictly positive vectors; the negative quadrant or negative
orthant consists of all strictly negative vectors. If z=(zk) is a conformable vector also, I
will write z » y for zk>yk for all k.
3. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THREE ACTIONS
To build intuition, it is best to start with the special case of m=2: the agent can do
either action 0, action 1, or action 2. Then there are only two incentive compatibility
constraints, each or which can be associated with a direction in two dimensional space.
Denote
Dj(M)=E0(M) - Ej(M), j=l,2
and so any mechanism can be represented a point D(M)=(Di(M), D2(M)) in two
dimensional space. Let Q(c) denote the quadrant (weakly) northeast of c=(ci, C2). Then a
mechanism M is feasible if and only if D(M) is in Q(c), it is wasteful if D(M) is in the
interior of Q(c). Figure 1 illustrates.
For any experience matrix x, let
5j(x) = wo(x)-wj(x),j=l,2.
Since
Dj(M) = EpeP(M)P J 5j(x) a(x,p,M)dx , j=l,2.
x ep(p,M)
= Spe P(M) P Aj(p,M) j=l,2
where we denote
Aj(p,M) =. J 5j(x) a(x,p,M) dx.
x ep(p,M)
Notice that D(M) is a weighted sum of the A's. The geometric reasoning is
essentially about the angles the A's form. The basic tool will be to show that if M is a
mechanism that meets certain conditions, then a reassignment of experiences among
payments will move D(M) northeast, and so create a wasteful mechanism if M was
feasible. It follows that a nonmanipulable mechanism must violate the conditions that
allowed this reassignment.
We proceed by series of steps that use this sort of reasoning repeatedly.
Step One: Let p* denote the largest element of P(M). Then if M is nonmanipulable
and 8(x) is in the positive quadrant then a(x,p*,M)=l.
Proof: Suppose 8(x) is in the positive quadrant, and oc(x,p*,M) < 1. Then there
must be some other p (possibly p=0), with a(x,p*,M) > 0 . Form M* from M by reducing
KQl-
7 (A)
a(x,p,M*) to zero and adding this probability to p*. Clearly M* is a replica of M. Then
D(M*) = D(M) - p a(x,p,M) 6(x) + p* a(x,p,M) 5(x)
=D(M) + (p*-p) a(x,p,M) 5(x)»D(M),
since p* > p by construction. Hence if M is feasible it is manipulable.
Step Two: If M is nonmanipulable and 5(x) is in the negative quadrant, then
cc(x,0,M)=l.
Proof is essentially the same as that for step one, since 0 is by construction the
smallest element of P(M).
Hence if all experiences are either in the positive or negative quadrant, the only
nonmanipulable mechanisms are one-step. The rest of the proof, therefore, must
concentrate on experiences in the quadrants II and IV~experiences x with precisely one
5j(x)>0.
For any experience x, let a(x) denote the angle between 5(x) and the Di-axis,
measured counterclockwise, as in figure 2.
Clearly a(x) depends only on the ratio [S2(x)/8i(x)].
For any two experiences (x,y) we will say "0(x,y) is positive" if some point on the
line between 5(x) and 5(y) is in the positive quadrant, as in figure 3.
We will say "0(x,y) is negative" if some point on the line between 8(x) and 8(y) is in the
negative quadrant, as in figure 4. Similarly, for any scalar (3, we will say "Q(x,Py) is
positive" if some point on the line between x and (38(y) is in the positive quadrant. Clearly
it is never the case that 0(x,y) is both positive and negative, but it may be the case the
neither statement can be made.
It should also be made clear the whether 0(x,y) is positive or not, and whether it is








quadrant II and 8(y) in quadrant IV, 0(x,y) is positive if and only if a(y)-a(x)>7t, in
radions, and negative is and only if a(y)-a(x)<7t. The angles, in turn, depend only on the
ratios 52(x)/5i(x) and 52(y)/5i(y). Since these ratios are unaffected by scalar
multiplication, we have the following useful results:
Positivitv lemma: If 0(x,y) is positive, and r and q are positive scalars, then
0(rx,qy) is also positive.
Negativity lemma: If 0(x,y) is negative and r and q are positive scalars, then
©(rx,qy) is also negative.
Algebraic proof of these lemmas is available, but the geometric intuition is clear.
Now we can process to consider experiences in quadrants II and IV.
Step Three: If 0(x,y) is positive, and M is nonmanipulable, then either
oc(x,p*,M)=l or oc(y,p*,M)=l.
Proof: Suppose p1 and p" are both less than p*, a(x,p',M)>0, and a(y,p",M)>0.
Form replica M* by shifting the proportion y of probability under x from p' to p*, and by
shifting the proportion e of probability under y from p" to p*. Then
D(M*) = D(M) - ycc(x,p',M) 8(x)p' + ya(x,p',M) 5(x)p*
- ea(y,p",M) 5(y)p" + ea(y,p",M) 5(y)p*
=D(M) + {(p*-p')ya(x,p',M) 5(x)
+ (p*-p")ea(y,p",M)5(y)}
Since 0(x,y) is positive, by the positivity lemma there exists a scalar (3 between 0 and 1
such that
(p*-p') a(x,p\M) p5(x) + (p*-p") a(y,p",M) 5(y) (1-p) » 0.




Step Four: If 0(x,y) is negative, and M is nonmanipulable, then either
cc(x,0,M)=l or oc(y,0,M)=l.
Proof is an obvious extension of the proof of step three.
Step Five: Suppose 8(x) and 8(y) are both in quadrant II with a(y)>a(x), and
a(x,p',M)>0 and oc(y,p",M)>0. Then if M is nonmanipulable p'>p".
Proof: Form replica M* by shifting 7 of the probability under x to p" and e of the
probability under y to p'. Then
D(M*) = D(M) - ya(x,p',M) 8(x)p' + ya(x,p',M) 5(x)p"
- ea(y,p",M) S(y)p" + ea(y,p",M) 5(y)p'
=D(M) +(p"-p') {ya(x,p',M) 8(x)
+ ea(y,p",M) (-5(y))}
It is geometrically obvious from figure 6 that some point on the line between 8(x) and
(-S(y)) is in the positive quadrant and so there is some pair of numbers y and e that makes
the expression in curly brackets strictly positive. So M will be manipulable unless p" < p'.
Step Six: Similarly, suppose 8(x) and 8(y) are both in quadrant IV with a(y)>a(x),
and cc(x,p',M)>0 and oc(y,p",M)>0. Then if M is nonmanipulable p1 < p".
We will say that experiences are complete in quadrant q if for every angle a* in
quadrant q there is some experience matrix x such that a(x)=a*. Experiences are circular if
they are complete in every quadrant. Experiences are relatively complete if every quadrant
either has no experiences or complete experiences. Obviously, circularity implies relative
completeness, but not the converse.




Proof: Suppose M is not one-step. Then there is some set of payments p2,
P3,...,pq with 0<pq < ...<p3<P2<P* and
Aj = Z^= 2 J a(x, pi, M) wj(x)dx
of positive measure for some action j . By steps one through four either all A(pi)are in
quadrant n, or all are in quadrant IV.
Assume w.l.o.g. that all A(pi) are in quadrant II. Let a* be the largest angle for
which there is some experience in some p(pi,M), i>l (clearly by step five Uiis will be an
experience in p(pq,M)). Similarly let a* be the smallest angle for which there is some
experience in some p(pi,M), i>l (clearly by step five this will be an experience in
p(p2,M)). Let x* be an experience for which a(x)=a*; let x* be an experience for which
a(x)=ajc. By step 2, a*< TC, and by step one, S^^K/2.
Suppose a*>aj<. Then it should be clear from figure 7 (and algebra) that ©(a*, -x*)
is positive.
Form replica M* from M in the following way. Decrease a(xn,p2,M) by the
proportion y, 0<y<l, and increase a(x)<,p*,M) by this amount. Decrease cc(x*,pq,M) by
the proportion e, 0<£<l, and increase oc(x*,0,M) by this amount.
Graphically, these changes are illustrated in figure 8. Since p*>p2. shifting part of
5(x*) from p2 to p* moves D(M) northwest at angle a* to a point like B in figure 8.
Removing payment from x* moves D( . ) southeast again, but at a different angle. So if y
and e are chosen properly, D(M*) can be northeast of D(M).
Algebraically:
D(M*) = D(M) + {(p*-p2) a(Xic,p2,M) y 5(x*)
+ pqa(x*,pq,M)e(-d(x*))}















Then D(M*)»D(M) and so M is manipulable if a*<aic.
So a*=a*. Then Aj will be of zero measure for all j .
QED.
The question then becomes when are experiences circular or relatively complete?
The answer is that when signals have at least two dimensions, experiences are generically
circular and always relatively complete; when signals have only one dimension experiences
are never circular but are always relatively complete.
It is easiest to start with the case of one voter and two dimensions. Generically, in
two dimensions, the means |io, M-i, M-2 will not be collinear. Then the perpendicular
bisectors between |io and jii, and between \XQ and [1.2 will intersect and divide the plane into
four regions as in figure 9.
Recall that the perpendicular bisector of two points is the locus of points equidistant
to the two of them. Since probability varies with distance, this implies that on the
perpendicular bisector between |io and jij, 5j(. )=0; closer to JIO, Sj(. )>0; and closer to
(ij, Sj(. )<0. Thus each of the regions in figure 9 corresponds to a quadrant in figures 1-8.
Now consider a line like J between the perpendicular bisectors at some positive
distance from their intersection A. Every point on J corresponds to a point in the second
quadrant. Arbitrarily close to the (lo ~M-l perpendicular bisector 8i(.) is arbitrarily close to
zero; 52(.)/l5l(.)i is arbitrarily large, and the corresponding angle is arbitrarily close to n/2.





to n. Clearly along J the angle changes continuously, and so for every angle in quadrant II
there is some experience on J. Repeating this process for the other three quadrants leads to
the conclusion that in this case experiences are circular.
Expanding the result to more than two dimensions is easy, provided once again the
fij are not collinear. Necessarily the three means will be coplanar, and on this plane figure
9 can be recreated, along with all the results derived from that figure.
With many voters the result obviously still holds, since it is an existence result.
The space in which experiences are located will be of dimension ns, but the means will still
be coplanar.
Circularity runs into trouble however, when signals have only one dimension (or
equivalently, when means are collinear). Consider the one-voter case again. Two
bisectors along a line divide it into at most three regions, not four, and so some quadrant in
figures 1-8 must lack experiences. If [1Q is between \i\ and |X2, then quadrant HI is empty
(every experience is closer to |iQ than to at least one of \i\ or \12). Since quadrant HI plays
no role in the proof, the nonmanipulability result continues to hold when experiences are
one-dimensional and [10 is between \x\ and \X2.
When JLIO is not the middle mean, either quadrant II or quadrant IV is empty.
Assume w.l.o.g. fi2<M-l<M-0- Then quadrant IV is empty, but experiences are still
relatively complete because they are complete in quadrant n. To see this, look at figure 10.
Experiences between ^(jil+W)) an<^ ^M-2+MO) ^  m quadrant 2. As x ranges between
these bounds, a(x) is a continuous function. For a(x) arbitrarily close to n/2, choose x
sufficiently close to j^U-i-J-ja-O); for a(x) arbitrarily close to K, choose x sufficiently close to
(^M-2+M-O)- Hence quadrant II is relatively complete.
Expansion to multiple voters is once again easy.
So we have show that when the agent has three actions to choose among, only one-





The purpose of this section is to generalize this result to the case of (m+1) different
actions available to the agent, instead of just three. We will proceed essentially the same
way we did in the last sections , but of necessity the discussion will be algebraic, rather
than pictorial. The intuition will be the same.
Instead of angles, it will be more convenient (since economists don't normally
work with spherical coordinates) to normalize experiences to the unit hypershpere (as
prices are normalized in many general equilibrium existence proofs). Specifically, define
the normalized vector d(x) for experience matrix x as
m
Then d(x) is a point on the unit hypersphere. Note that if for some positive scalar y,
5(x)=78(y), then d(x)=d(y).
Once again, let p* denote the largest possible payment under mechanism M. The
reasoning of steps one and two in the last section did not depend on dimensionality at all,
and so those steps carry over without any difficulty:
Proposition 1: If d(x) is in the positive orthant and M is nonmanipulable, then
oc(x,p*,M)=l. If d(x) is in the negative orthant, then oc(x,O,M)=l.
Next we define a relation R among experience matrices. Define xRy iff d(x) ^ d(y)
and there exists a positive scalar y such that yd(x) - d(y)»0. Clearly if xRy and
d(x )=d(x) and d(y )=d(y), x Ry . The relation R is transitive and asymmetric but not
complete. The intuitive way to read the relation R in two dimension, for instance, is, in
quadrant II, "xRy iff a(x) < a(y)." More generally, xRy means that the normalized
experience vector for x is "closer" to the positive orthant than d(y) in every direction
measure parallel to a coordinate axis (e.g, on both latitude and longitude on a sphere). It is
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easy to prove, for instance, that if d(x) is in the positive orthant, then xRy for any y with
d(x) * d(y), and if d(y) is in the negative orthant, xRy for all x with d(x) * d(y).
Algebra can make this clearer. Consider an experience matrix x. Let K denote the
set of actions j for which dj(x)>0, K" the set for which dj(x)<0, and K the set for which
dj(x)=0. The partition of actions into these sets identifies the orthant in which d(x) is
located. Then xRy iff
(2) dj(y)<OforjeK°, and
(3) min ^ M max djCy)( 3 )
 J £ K . dj(x) J £ K + dj(x)
where (3) is equivalent to
dk(x) dk(y) whenever \CFK+ \PK~
-dj(x) > -dj(y) whenever JceK , jeK .
Two more algebraic facts about the relation R are important before we derive the
general result. The first is in some ways analogous to the positivity lemma:
General Positivity Lemma: Suppose xRy, and let q and r be arbitrary positive
scalars.. Then there exist scalars a and b, 0<a, b<l, such that
ar5(x) - bq5(y) » 0.
Proof: From the definition of R and of normalized experience matrices, there exists
a positive scalar y such that
yd(x) - d(y) » 0.
Multiply through by —^— > 0. We obtain
yq+r
(7q)
r5(x) - - ^ - q5(y) » 0.
yq+r yq+r




Second, we will extend our definitions of completeness and circularity in the
obvious fashion. Experiences are complete in a neighborhood N(x,e) of x if for every d in
the neighborhood N(d(x),e) there is an experience matrix y such that d(y)=d.
Completeness Lemma: Let x be an experience matrix with the following
characteristics:
(1) experiences are complete in every sufficiently small neighborhood of x; and
(2) for some j , dj(x)<0.
Then in every sufficiently small neighborhood of 8(x) there is a vector 5(y) such
that xRy and a vector 8(z) such that zRx.
Proof: Construct 5 in the following way for some small rpO:
Sj(y) = 5j(c) - TI for j = l , . . .,m.
Let d be the normalized vector for 8. The distance between d and d(x) is a continuous
function of r\ (since ld(x)l=l>0), and equals zero when r|=0. Hence for any sufficiently
small e>0 there is some r\ such that the distance between d and d(x) is less than or equal to
e. From the completeness of experiences, there is some experience y with d(y)=d.
It remains to show that xRy. That is, that (2) and (3) are satisfied.
First consider j e K°. By construction 8j = -rj, and so
d(y) < 0
So (2) is satisfied.
Next consider j e K+. By construction Sj = dj(x)-ri, and so




 = nsooii 5j(x) - TI < H8(x)ii
dJ ( x ) 11811 8j(x) us || '
Finally, consider j e K~. By similar reasoning
1 6
5j(x) - rj H5(x)H
5j(x)
since both 8j(x)-r| and dj(x) are negative and I8j(x)-rjl>l8j(x)l.
Since (4) holds for all j e K+, it holds for the j for which [dj(y)/dj(x)] is a
maximum. Similarly, (5) holds for the j for which [dj(y)/dj(x)] is a minimum. Combining
(4) and (5) we obtain
min d ^ ! ! § £ ! > max d j M
jeK- dJ ( x ) II5|| jeK+ dJ ( x )
which implies (3). So we have established the existence of some experience y in the
neighborhood of x such that xRy.
Finding z such that zRx is a similar process.The only difference is that instead of




These two lemmas allow us to derive the propositions we need. First, analogous to
step five, we have:
Proposition 2: Suppose xRy and a(x, p',M) >0 and a(y, p",M) >0. Then if M is
nonmanipulable, p' > p".
Proof: Form replica M* by decreasing a(x, p',M) by aa(x, p',M) and increasing
a(x, p", M) by the same amount; and by decreasing oc(y, p",M) by boc(y, p",M) and
increasing a(y, p',M)by the same amount. Then
D(M*) = D(M) + (p11- p1) a(x, p',M) a5(x)
+ (p1 - p") a(y, p",M) b5(y)
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=D(M) + (p"- p') [a(x, p',M) a5(x) - a(y, p",M) b8(y)]
By the general positivity lemma there exist a and b with 0<a,b<l that make the expression
in square brackets strictly positive. So if p"- p'>0, M is manipulable.
QED
Proposition 3: Suppose xRy and cc(x, p',M) > 0, where 0< p1 <p* and
a(y, p", M) > 0, where p">0. Then if M is feasible it is manipulable.
Proof: Form replica M* by setting
a(x, p',M*) = (l-a)a(x, p',M)
a(x, p*,M*) = a(x, p*,M) + aa(x, p',M)
a(y, p", M*) = (1-b) a(y, p", M)
a(y, 0, M*) = a(y, 0, M) + ba(y, p", M);
for some 0<a,b<l; and otherwise M* is the same as M. Then
D(M*) = D(M) +[a (p* - p1) cc(x, p',M) 5(x) - ba(y, p", M) 8(y)].
By the general positivity lemma, some positive scalars a,b can be found that make
the expression in square brackets strictly positive. Hence D(M*)»D(M) and if M is
feasible, then it is manipulable.
QED.
Let F(m) denote the set of normalized experience vectors for experience matrices
that trigger intermediate payments
F(M) = {d(x)l there exists a payment p such that a(x, p, M) > 0 and 0<p<p*}.
Proposition 4: If Mis nonmanipulable, and d(x) e F(M), then either d(x) e bdry
F(M), or experiences are not complete in the neighborhood of x.
Proof: Suppose d(x) e int F(m). By the completeness lemma, there exist
experiences y and z in the neighborhood of x with xRy and zRx; since d(x) e int F(M), d(y)
e F(M) and d(z) e F(M); all for some sufficiently small neighborhood of d(x). but xRy,
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d(x) e F(M), and d(y) e F(M) contradicts proposition 3. Similarly for zRx, d(x) e F(M),
andd(z)eF(M)
QED.
Hence if d(x) e F(M), it is either on the boundary of F(M), or it is isolated in the
sense that experiences are not complete in the neighborhood of x. In either case, F(M) is at
most an (m-2)-dimensional set, since it has no interior on the ((m-l))-dimensional) surface
of an m-dimensional hypersphere.
Let ^(M) denote the set of §'s for which the corresponding normalized vectors are
inF(M)
^(M) = {51 there exists an x such that d(x) e F(M) and 8(x) = 8}.
Then ^(M) must be at most and (m-1) dimensional set, and so
Jg(t)dt = O
for any function g ( . ) [Rogosinski, 1962, p. 100, theorem 34]. Specifically, let
g(t) = S™
 x Itjl dt.
Then
£ ^ 1 fltil dt = 0
and so
Jltjldt= Jl5j(x)l dx = 0, j = 1, . . . , m ,
xeF*(M)
where F*(M) = {xl 5(x) e ¥(M)). Thus
Jlwo(x) - WJ(X)I dx = 0, j = 1, . . . , m.
xeF*(M)
Let Gj(M) = (xe F*(M)I wo(x) = wj(x)}. Clearly Gj(M) is of measure zero.
Then
Jiwo(x) - WJ(X)I dx = 0, j = 1, . . . , m.
xeF*(M)IGj(M)
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and so F*(M)IGj(M) must be of measure zero also, since the integrand is positive. Since
the union of a finite number of sets of measure is also of measure zero, we have:
Proposition 5: If M is nonmanipulable, F*(M) is of measure zero.
This establishes that all nonmanipulable mechanisms are one-step.
5. APPLICATION TO MAJORITY RULE
Majority rule is one of the most salient one-step mechanisms, and in [1990] I
showed that for the case of m=s=l, it was the only nonmanipulable mechanism Since
municipalities often elect mayors by processes that resemble majority rule, a natural
question is whether this result generalizes.
I do not know the answer to this natural question. This section will show,
however, that majority rule is the only nonmanipulable mechanism in another special case,
but one slightly broader than m=s=l.
In particular, suppose the agent has two different independent tasks to perform (for
instance: police and fire, or sewers and library) and has only two different ways to perform
each task: she can work or she can shirk. Then the number of different actions available to
the agent is four. We take action 0 to be working at each task and action 3 to be shirking at
each task. Each citizen receives a separate independent one-dimensional signal about each
task. Thus m=3 and s=2.
Working rather than shirking on each task is equally onerous to the agent, and these
disutilities are additive. If g is the disutility of working rather than shirking on a particular
task, and action j involves working on precisely kj tasks and shirking on the rest,
cj = g(2 -kj)
This is a strong and unrealistic symmetry condition, but is needed for computational
simplicity.
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The signals will also treat the tasks symmetrically. Let X=(Xi,X2) denote the
signal a voter receives. If the agent works on task I, the expected value of Xi is |i>0; if she
shirks, the expected value of Xi is 0. Thus if the agent chooses action 0—working on all
tasks—the expected value of X is (ji,|i). If the agent chooses action 3—shirking on all
tasks~the expected value of X is (0,0).
I will also confine my attention to anonymous, yes-no mechanisms. These are
mechanisms where each citizen has only two ways of voting ("yes" or "no") and votes are
counted, one to customer, not named. In [1990] for the case m=s=l, I showed that these
restrictions were harmless: if voters had additional wimpy ways of voting ("maybe,"
"abstain," "sort of yes"), they would use these wimpy ways only with probability zero; and
if voters' signals were all drawn from the same distribution~if no voters, for instance,
were more perceptive or knowledgeable than the rest-then none should be treated
differently. I have no reason not to believe these restrictions are harmless in this case too.
Anonymous, one-step, yes-no mechanisms are described by three parameters: the
minimum number of votes v required to reward the agent, the region R of R in which a
voter's experience must lie to trigger a yes vote and the payment p. It is easy to see that
nonmanipulability requires that the agent be rewarded when more than v "yes" votes are
cast, as well.
For a one-step mechanism, feasibility is simply
pAj(v,R) > g(2-kj) j=l 3
where we have abused notation slightly to reflect the fact that v and R are the only
parameters of M that affect A(.). For nonmanipulable mechanisms, it follows that
(6) p = maxj g K
J
 Aj(v, R)
Why? If p were less, the mechanism would not be feasible; if p were greater, the
mechanism would be wasteful. Thus from (6), v and R are the only independent
parameters for designing mechanisms.
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Suppose (v,R) describes a mechanism M, but there is another mechanism M' with
parameters (v1, R') for which
2 - kj 2 - ki
max, '— < maxi *—
3
 Aj(v\ R') J Aj(v, R)
Then reporting experiences according to (v1, R') but paying p would create a wasteful
mechanism. So a mechanism is manipulable unless it minimizes




or equivalently, unless it maximizes
Z(v, R) = minj Zj(v, R)
where
Zj(v, R) = 2 " k iJ
 Aj(v, R)
A nonmanipulable mechanism must maximize Z(v,R).
So we must consider how maximize Z(v,R). Let (m*,R*) maximize Z3(v, R).
Since Z(m,R) is a minimum of three components
max(V)R) Z(v,R) < Z3(m*,R*).
(The same would hold for any action j , not just action 3). This upper bound would be
achieved if
(7) Zj(v*,R*) > Z3(v*,R*) j=l,2
because if (7) held we would have
Z(v*,R*) = minj Zj(v*,R*) = Z3(v*,R*),
and (v*,R*) would maximize Z( . ) .
Moreover, if (7) held, (v*,R*) would be a unique maximizer of Z( . ) . -- assuming
it was a unique maximizer of Z3(.) . For consider any (v',R') that does not maximize
Z3(. ) . Then
Z(v\ R1) < Z3(v', R1) < Z3(v*,R*) = Z(v*,R*).
The strategy for showing nonmanipulability of majority rule therefore consists of
three steps. The first is to define majority rule as the mechanism with a particular (v*,R*).
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The next step is to show that this (v*,R*) maximizes Z3(v,R). The third step is to show
that it satisfies (7).
Step One: Define v* = n/2 and R* = {X e R2I (Xi + X2)/2 > ja/2}. Since n is
large, the probability of ties can be ignored. The region of acceptance is the region where
the average signal component is closer to the working mean (ji, p.) than the shirking mean
(0, 0). This region of acceptance commands sincere voting in the following sense.
Suppose there is only one voter, and the only actions available to the agent are 0 and 3; she
either works on all tasks or shirks on all tasks. The voter votes yes if and only if the signal
he receives is more probable under the hypothesis that the agent worked on all tasks than
under the hypothesis that the agent shirked on all tasks. Figure 11 illustrates:
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Step Two: Showing that (v*,R*) minimizes Z3(v,R) requires two steps in itself.
First, fix R and consider the optimal v(R) for arbitrary R. Let Wo(R) denote the
probability that an individual voter will receive a signal in region R - and therefore vote yes
-- if the agent chooses action 0. Similarly, let Wj(R) denote the probability that an
individual voter votes yes if the agent chooses action j .
Since n is large, the number of affirmative votes if the agent chooses action j (j= 0,
. . . , 3) is a normal variable with mean Wj(R)n and variance nWj(R)[l-Wj(R)].
Denote
G2(Wj(R))=Wj(R)[l-Wj(R)].
Hence the probability that the agent will be paid if she chooses action j and the rule is that v
votes are required is
1 - O(vl nWj(R), na(Wj(R)))
) j , , ,
a(Wj(R))
where O(. la, b) denotes the cdf of the normal distribution with mean a and standard error
b, and <£(.) denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
Hence
A . r,x *, r v/n - W3(R) x _, r v/n - W3(R\A3(v, R) = <£(Vn — 21—L) O(Vn — ^ - z )) (  )
G(W 3 (R)) s(W3(R))
Maximizing A3(v,R) with respect to v is simple. The first order condition is




 Y(R) = v/n = W0(R)g(W3(R)) + W3(R)a(W0(R))
o(W3(R)) + G(W0(R))
This result is obvious from figure 12. If the rule requires v votes to win, then the
probability of winning is A+B+C if the agent shirks, and B+C+D if she works. So A(v,R)
= B+C+D - (A+B+C) = D-A.
But D-A is maximized at y(R). Similarly, on the other side we have
A(v,R) = (B+A) -A = B
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and B is maximized at 7(R).
Thus for arbitrary R we have
A ( y ( R ) , R ) = O ( Wo(R)-W3(R) . W 3 (R)-W 0 (R)
a(W3(R)) + o(W0(R)) o(W3(R)) + o(W0(R))
>(
o(W3(R)) + o(W0(R))
Since is monotonically increasing, the problem of maximizing A3(.) becomes the
problem of choosing R to maximize.
= WQ(R) - W3(R)
a(W3(R)) + o(W0(R))'
Notice that R* maximizes the numerator of this expression, because R* includes precisely
those vectors X which have greater probability under action 0 than under action 3.
To show that R* maximizes q(R), let (j)j(X) denote the probability that a voter will
have experience X if the agent does action j . Clearly
Wj(R)= J<{>j(X)dX.
XeR
We need the following lemma:
Symmetry Lemma: Wo(R*) + W3(R*) = 1.
Proof: Let d(A,B) denote the Euclidean distance between any two points A and B.
Then by hypothesis <}>0(X) depends only on d(X,(ji, |i)) and (J>3(X) depends only on d(X,
(0, 0)).
For any experience X form a corresponding experience X' by the following rule:




d(X\(|i, JO) = Zi (X'i - ^i)2 = Zi fti - Xi - ^i)2 = Zi Xi2
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d(X,(O,O)) = d(X\(^, \i)) and 4>3(X) = <t>0(Xf).
By similar reasoning
d(X\ (0, 0)) = d(X, (n, n)).
Thus X e R* if and only if X' t R*. Hence
W3(R) = J <|>3(X) dX = J <j>o(X') dX'
XeR* X ' £R*
= 1 - W0(R*).
QED.
To maximize q( . ) , then, let a(X) denote the probability that experience X is in R,
and take the derivative with respect to q( . ) :
1-
Evaluate this expression at R*. From symmetry lemma, GO= ^3 and 1-2W3 = -(l-2Wo),
and so
where K is a positive number that does not depend on X. This expression is positive in R*
and negative outside it; hence R* maximizes q(. )•
Plugging back into (8):
y(R*) = i {W0(R*) + W3(R*) )=\ = v*/n
by the symmetry lemma.
Thus we have established that (v*,R*) maximizes A3(.), and so it maximizes
A3(v, R) A3(v, R)
R)
since k3=0, by construction. In particular
W(R*) - -
(9) Z3(v*, R*) = <D( V^ m * )
a(W(R*))
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Step Three: The final step is to show that (7) is satisfied.
Since region R* is symmetrical with respect to actions 1 and 2 and tasks 1 and 2,
we need only consider one other action: say, working on task 1 and shirking on task 2.
We call this action 1. If the agent takes action 1, the mean vector of signals is (jj.,0).
The first step is to calculate W,(R*). As figure it suggests, Wi(R*) = 1/2.
More rigorously from any experience vector X, form X" in the following manner:
X " I = 2 J I - X I
X"2 = -X2
Since
and so X and X" are equally probable if the agent does action 1. Moreover, since
whenever X is in R*, X" is not in R*, and conversely. Thus for every experience in R*,
there is an equally probable experience not in R*, and conversely It follows that Wi(R*)
1/2.
Hence
^ ^ ^ O(j I j,Vn)- O(^ 1 nW0(R*), a(W0(R*)Wn)
o(W0(R*))









That completes step three. We have shown that in this special case, majority mie is
nonmanipulable. Extensions beyond this case are difficult because with either differing
costs or more tasks, the acceptance region does not have a simple analytic structure like thai
of R*.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
What do one-step mechanisms and the short ballot have to do with each other?
Suppose the mayor of a town were rewarded according to a many-step mechanism: one
amount for good police performance but bad libraries, say; another amount for the
opposite; a third amount for good performance on both. Then there really would be no
need for a mayor; people could vote on police and libraries separately.
But we have seen that such many-step mechanisms are manipulable. Whether or
not the agent was one person was irrelevant to this demonstration; what was important was
that voters considered the entire ensemble of experiences in order to provide maximum
incentive for the ensemble of agents. Each possible action had its own constraint that had
to be satisfied, and no trading off between these constraints was permitted. It would not
have mattered if different actions were associated with different agents. The structure of
the problem allowed decentralization; the requirement of nonmanipulability forced
centralization.
For political scientists this is not a novel result. What happens when a manipulable
mechanism is established? Someone manipulates it. I don't have a theory of how
manipulation occurs, but a manipulator is likely to acquire rent; manipulation as I defined it
was essentially a rent-seeking activity. Manipulation, moreover, will occur through
informal channels, since the formal ones leave the opportunity for it to occur. Machines are
the best known informal rent-seeking organizations in American politics. Thus machines
should flourish in cities with decentralized and hence manipulable governance structures —
just as political scientists have been saying for several decades (for a review of this
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literature see Fuchs [1992]). And this is also what the late nineteenth century reformers
who pushed for the short ballot were saying. (Of course, since municipal governance
structure should not be considered exogenous, I am not arguing that decentralization causes
machines ~ only that the two phenomena tend to be found in the same places.).
But if centralization is good, as I have argued, why isn't everything centralized?
The answer is in the companion paper (O'Flaherty [1995]). The key assumption in this
paper is that all of the voters care about and receive signals about the same actions. The
people who use the library are the same as the people who use the sewers. In the
companion paper I showed that when voters care about different actions, even of the same
agent, any centralized mechanism is manipulable. Forcing the citizens of Morningside
Heights, who use only the Morningside Heights library branch, to vote in the same election
as the citizens of Eltingville, who use only the Eltingville branch, creates a manipulable
mechanism. Taken together, these two papers argue for geographic decentralization with
functional centralization: small towns that do a lot of different things. Not a bad picture of
suburban governance. The companion paper also explains the production externality that
causes a few large city governments to form around centers of urban productivity. Thus
the two papers form a coherent explanation for the basic outlines of metropolitan
governance — big cities, small towns, and many functions. 1 don't know of any other
theory that does this.
But the theory is far from complete. In this paper, all voters were the same — they
cared about the same things in the same way, and received(stochastically) the same
information. In the companion paper, there was a sharp cleavage between the two groups
of voters: Morningside Heights voters knew and cared only about Morningside Heights;
Eltingville voters knew and cared only about Eltingville. The intermediate cases are
probably those where most controversies occur. They should be studied next.
Probably the most interesting intermediate case is education. Schools are probably
the most common exception to the rule of unified local governments; surely they are the
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most important financially. Many municipalities have elected boards of education that are
independent of the rest of municipal government - although many do not. Why are
elected school boards more common than elected dog-catchers? Because the constituency
for schools is different from the constituency for dog-catching. Everyone in town gets
worried about getting bitten by rabid dogs, but to the extent that it is really only the parents
of public school children who worry about school quality, separate elections are called for.
Economies of scale matter too: towns set up for dog-catching or policing may be too small
to support a quality high school, and so regional school boards call for regional rather than
town elections.
But each of these arguments for separate elections is in itself highly debatable.
Businesses, property owners, and ordinary citizens who want children to be respectful and
law-abiding and to grow into adulthood as responsible citizens also have a stake in the
school system, ~ and some knowledge of its performance, too. Economies of scale are
also open to question. That some school boards are appointed rather than elected should
therefore not be surprising.
This is not a paper about education. But the technique and results of this paper and
the companion paper are essential, I think, to understanding how education is organized in
the United States, and how (if at all) that organization might be improved. The same is true
for police work, fire protection, sanitation and disease control, dog-catching, local streets,
alcohol regulation, and a host of other services.
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